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The paper analyses the way in which monetary and fiscal policy influences the 
performances of economic growth. The analysis is made on the basis of a dynamic 
model with discrete variables of the Sidrauski- Brock type, with infinite-lived 
households and money in the utility function. The model is with a representative 
private agent and a government sector consisting of a consolidated fiscal authority and 
central bank. Households receive an exogenous perishable endowment each period, 
decide about consumption and pay net real lump-sum tax. 
  The state variable of the model is government debt, and the decision variables 
are: consumption and the amount of money detained by the agent. 
  The optimality conditions are obtained by using the Maximum Principle for 
discrete dynamic systems. A qualitative analysis of the optimal trajectories is 
performed, on the basis of the information provided by the Maximum Principle, 
concerning the dynamics of the dual variable and the properties of the Lagrange 
multipliers. 
  Finally, we analyze the influence of several monetary and fiscal decisions on 
the optimal trajectories and on the performance-function of the model. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy action on 
economic growth has been debated by both economists and policy makers. 
The traditional optimal currency areas literature pointed out long ago that, in a 
monetary union, fiscal policy has to play a more important role in cyclical 
stabilization given the loss of national monetary independence. This is particularly the 
case if shocks are not perfectly correlated across frontiers. Fiscal flexibility, together 
with budgetary discipline and co-ordination, has come to be seen as a central pillar of 
fiscal policy in a currency area (Commission, 1990). The Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) has been the operational response of EU countries to the quest for budgetary 
discipline in EMU. 
Recent theoretical and empirical developments have shed new light on the 
‘old’ issue of the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities. 
There are numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, analyzing the 
relation between inflation and long-run growth. 
In the past decade the development of the endogenous growth literature 
pioneered by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Rebelo (1991) has enhanced our 
understanding about how an economy’s growth performance can be affected by public 
policies. For instance, Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) study the effects of 
fiscal policies, such as government spending and taxation, on economic growth. The 
general conclusion is that taxation adversely affects long-run growth performance and 
that the quantitative impacts are much larger than those found in exogenous growth 
models. Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995) and van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis 
(1994) examine the effects of monetary policies, such as changes in the growth rates 
of nominal money supply, on long-run real activity. These authors find support for the 
conventional wisdom that inflation and long-run growth are inversely related. These 
studies also represent an advance in our understanding of the impact of alternative 
policies on inflation and growth. 
Recently economists have been paying increasing attention to a dynamic 
general equilibrium approach to the theory of price level that is often called the fiscal 
theory of the price level, or FTPL. This way of thinking emphasizes the role of fiscal 
and monetary policy in determining the risk and return properties of government  4 
liabilities. It is particularly useful in analyzing proposals for large-scale institutional 
changes that imply shifts in monetary and fiscal policies. When dollarization is 
considered from this perspective, some disadvantages are brought to light that may 
not be so apparent from other points of view. 
The so-called fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) has highlighted that, if 
government solvency is not guaranteed, monetary policy will not be able to control 
the price level. In order to ensure stability, fiscal policy has to react sufficiently 
strongly to a rise in the interest rate in the event of inflationary pressures by increasing 
the primary surplus. In other words, monetary policy aiming at keeping inflation in 
check – as the ECD is mandated to behave – has to go hand-in-hand with a fiscal 
policy obeying a solvency constraint. Once the FTPL is applied to the EMU 
institutional set-up, however, seemingly different conclusions are drawn. While Sims 
(1999) considers the Maastricht cum SGP rules insufficient to rule out FTPL’s doom 
scenario, Canzoneri and Diba (2001) conclude that the SGP appears far too strict from 
the point of view of guaranteeing fiscal solvency. The latter authors, in particular, call 
for shifting attention from actual to cyclically-adjusted budget balances in assessing 






2. The model 
2.1 Household and government behavior 
 
In this section we study a dynamic model, originally due to Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1983), that shows how standard monetary models have a continuum of 
equilibrium time paths for the inflation rate. The model is a Sidrauski – Brock type 
model with infinite-lived households and money in the utility function. Such models 
are ones in which it is common for Ricardian equivalence results to be obtained, 
which makes the fiscalist theory’s claim more remarkable than if developed in a 
model of the overlapping generations type. This type of models was used by several  5 
authors, such as Woodford (1994, 1995, 2000), Sims (1994, 1996), McCallum (1998), 
Buiter (1999, 2001), Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Chanda and Nolan (2002). 
The model is with a representative private agent and a government sector, 
consisting of a consolidated fiscal authority and central bank. 
There is no uncertainty and markets are complete. Time indexed by t is 
measured in discrete intervals of equal length, normalized to unity. 
Households receive an exogenous perishable endowment, yt>0, each period, 
consume ct≥0 and pay net real lump-sum tax ht. 
The money price of output in period t is Pt. The quantities of money and 
nominal bonds outstanding at the beginning of period t (and the end of period t-1) are 
denoted Mt, respectively Bt. The it is one-period risk-free nominal interest rate in 
period t, and rt the one-period risk-free real interest rate in period t. 
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In order to transform inequalty (2) into an equation, we introduce the slack 
variable xt: 
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In equilibrium, when planned expenditure equals supply, it follows that the 
economy-wide resource constraint is given by: 
0 t , y g c t t t ≥ ∀ = +     (5)  6 
where we denoted by  t g  real government expenditure in period t. Equation (4) 
becomes: 
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where  t t g h −  is primary surplus. 
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Relationship (9) represents a solvency condition for the government, or a non-
Ponzi game condition (Artis and Marcellino – 1998). 
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2.2 The Optimization Problem 
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where  () ⋅ ⋅, U  denotes the utility, increasing in both arguments, strictly concave and 
twice differentiable, i.e.: 
() () 0 , U , 0 , U z c > ⋅ ⋅ ′ > ⋅ ⋅ ′   (12) 
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We denoted by: 
1 t t M Z + =   (16) 
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where δ>0 is the subjective rate of time preference. 
 
The representative agent maximizes (11) subject to the following dynamic 
equation: 
() ( ) [] t t t t t t t t t 1 t x Z i c h y P W i 1 W − − − − + + = +   (18) 
W0 given and: 
t 1 t Z W ≥ +   (19) 
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Condition (19) can be written as: 
0 B or    M M B 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t ≥ ≥ + + + + +   (19`) 
 
In order to obtain the optimality conditions, we shall apply the Maximum 
Principle for dynamic systems with discrete variables (Altar, 1976). 
 
The Hamiltonian is: 
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where we denoted by  t ψ  the dual variable,  t λ  and  t µ  are the Lagrange multipliers 
corresponding to constraints (19) and (20). 
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(25) 
or 
()() t t t t 1 t i 1 i 1 λ + + ψ + = ψ −   (26) 
Concerning the Lagrange multipliers, the Maximum Principle provides the 
following information: 
[] 0 Z W            ;    0 t 1 t t t = − λ ≥ λ +  
0 x              ;   0 t t t = ⋅ µ ≥ µ  
(27) 
 
From the second condition (29) we can see that xt > 0 implies µt = 0. 
In this case, from the third relation (24) it would follow  0 t t = µ = Ψ , which 
would make the problem senseless. It follows that  0 x t = 0 , ≥ ∀t  , hence the 
consumer budget constraint (2) on the optimal trajectory is satisfied as an equality. 
From the first relation (27) it follows that  0 t > λ  implies  0 Z W t 1 t = − + , i.e. 
0 B 1 t = + . In other words, if  0 t > λ , then the agent will not buy bonds in the given 
period.  
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and the dynamic equation becomes: 
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2.3 Qualitative analysis of optimal trajectories 
 
In what follows, to facilitate the analysis, we assume that the utility function         
is separable in both arguments: 
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In this case, the optimality conditions (29) become: 
                          ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' t t t t t q P i c V α + + =   (32) 
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If  0 B 1 t > + , in other words, if the agent buys bonds the n
th multiplier αt 
vanishes and the relations (30) – (33) become: 
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Writing the optimality condition (35) for two consecutive periods, we have: 
t t t t q P ) i 1 ( ) c ( ' V + =  
1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t q P ) i 1 ( ) c ( ' V − − − − + =  
and, taking into account relation (34), it follows: 
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where πt-1 stands for inflation rate, relation (37) becomes: 
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where δ is the subjective rate of preference and r is the risk-free real interest rate. 
Relation (39) allows to identify the following situations: 
a)  if  δ = −1 t r,  t h e n   1 t t c c − =  
b)  if  δ > −1 t r,  t h e n   1 t t c c − >  
c)  if  δ < −1 t r , then  1 t t c c − <  
Therefore, depending on the evolution of inflation and of the risk-free nominal 
interest rate, consumption can be constant, increasing or decreasing. 
To identify the evolution of the demand for money, we use optimality 
condition (36). We obtain: 
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If we admit that: 
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and 










1 t . 
Thus, under assumptions (a), (b), (c), the demand for money growths with the 
same rate as inflation: 
() t 1 t M 1 M ⋅ π + = +   (43) 
 
 
2.4. Transversality conditions 
 
For the optimal trajectories, the Maximum Principle provides the 
transversality condition:  
0 W lim T T T = ψ
∞ →   (44) 
                                                                                               
Taking into account the substitution (28), relation (44) becomes:  
0 W q lim T T
T
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∞ →   (45) 
                                                                  
Since  T T T M B W + =   with  0 BT ≥  and  0 MT ≥ , the transversality condition  
(45) becomes: 
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T
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(46)  13 
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Remark:  Relation (20), given earlier, follows from (46’) and (47’). 
If the nominal risk-free interest rate is constant: 
0 k , i i i 1 k k ≥ ∀ = = +   (49) 
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This means that the sequences { N t t} B ∈  and { N t t} M { ∈  should increase slower 
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2.5. The case of Bernoulli type utility functions 
 
In order to have a convenient parametric example, we assume that the utility 
functions V(.) and φ(.) are of Bernoulli type , i.e. their elasticity of marginal utility is 
constant. 





































where σ ∈ (0,1). 

















=   (51) 
Relation (51) represents a dynamic equation for the control variable  t c.   
As a matter of fact , it is known that the Bernoulli type utility functions are the 
only utility functions allowing the inference of a dynamic equation for the control 
variable. 
Relation (51) shows that, in order to know the dynamics of optimal 
consumption, it is sufficient to know the evolution of the risk-free real interest rate, as 
well as the initial value   0 c  of consumption. 
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It can be seen that the demand for money  1 t M +  increases as  t P  and  t C  
increase and decreases as  t i  increases, which is consistent with the properties that a 
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It can be seen that  1 t m +  decreases as the inflation rate  t π  increases. 
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then, from (51), it follows that consumption is constant, i.e. 
t , c c 1 t t ∀ = −   (59) 
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From (58) we obtain the nominal interest rate: 
() () 1 1 1 i − π + δ + =   (61) 
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Therefore, under the above assumption, if the Central Bank decides about the 
magnitude of the inflation rate π , the magnitude of the nominal interest rate will be 
given by (61), and the real demand for money will be given by (62). 
  
 
3. Compatibility between Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Fiscal Solvency. 
 
The interaction between monetary and fiscal policy remains a topic of intense 
interest to macroeconomists. 
In this section, we adopt several simple assumptions concerning monetary and 
fiscal policy, in order to see how the Fiscal Solvency conditions are satisfied (these 
are, in fact, transversality conditions (46’) and (47’) ). 
As it concerns the monetary policy of the Central Bank, we assume that the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
a). constant inflation rate; 
b). constant nominal interest rate. 
Moreover, we assume that the nominal interest rate is that given by the 
formula (61), which implies constant consumption. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the exogenous endowment y is the 
same in each period: 
         0 t        y y y t 1 t ≥ ∀ = = −   (63) 
 
Since the real government expenditure in each period is  
 
t t t c y g − =  
it follows that this is also constant, hence  
          0 t        g g g t 1 t ≥ ∀ = = −   (64)  
  17 
Dividing by  t P  the budget equation (2) of the household, we obtain  
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and taking into account that y-c=g, relation (66) can be written as 
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 Taking into account the assumptions concerning inflation rate and nominal 
interest rate, it follows that the real demand for money is also constant: 
0 t m m m t 1 t ≥ ∀ = = +   (68) 
its magnitude being given by relation (62). 
Formula (67) can be written as: 
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where we denoted by  t S  primary surplus inclusive of seignorage; 
        g - m h S t t π + =   (70)  
 
As it concerns fiscal policy, we assume a constant lump-sum tax: 
    0 t               h          h t ≥ ∀ =   (71)     
In this case, the primary surplus inclusive of seignorage is constant : 
       0 t                          S St ≥ ∀ =  (72)  
and equation (69’) becomes: 
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 The solution of the difference equation (73’) is  18 
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We remark that if the value of the tax is given by (80), then from the dynamic 
equation (73), we obtain  
N t , b ... b b b t 2 1 0 ∈ ∀ = = = =   (81) 
i.e. the real debt is constant, and the nominal debt increases at the inflation rate: 
() 0
T
T B 1 B π + =   (82) 
From the budget constraint equation for  0 t =  , we have 
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For the considered hypotheses the optimal solution is as follows: 
0 t , c c ... c c t 1 0 ≥ ∀ = = = =   (85) 
where c is given in (84) 
0 t , m m ... m m t 1 0 ≥ ∀ = = = =   (86) 
It follows that the nominal money demand is given by: 
() 0 t , M 1 M 0
t
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Considering (84) it follows 
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One can observe that the objective function depends on the inflation rate π, 




We studied in this paper a discrete time economic growth model, having 
elements of monetary and fiscal policy. For the case when the utility function of the 
household is of Bernoulli type, we obtained the dynamic equation of consumption. 
The dynamics depend on the nominal interest rate and on the inflation rate. If the real 
interest rate coincides with the subjective discount rate, then optimal consumption is 
constant on the whole horizon. The real demand for money is also constant.  20 
Assuming a monetary policy rule with constant nominal interest rate and 
constant inflation rate, we inferred the fiscal policy rules compatible with this one. 
Fiscal solvency is an important concern in the design of macroeconomic 
policy in EMU. Within the model, fiscal solvency conditions practically coincides 
with the transversality conditions provided by the Maximum Principle. 
There are a number of directions in which our analysis can be developed. 
Obvious extensions include the incorporation of distortionary taxation and of “useful” 
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